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1CHOICE FUNCTIONS: RATIONALITY
RE-EXAMINED
Begoña Subiza and Josep E. Peris
WP-AD 99-27
ABSTRACT
On analyzing the problem that arises whenever the set of maximal ele-
ments is large, and a selection is then required (see Peris and Subiza, 1998),
we realize that logical ways of selecting among maximals violate the clas-
sical notion and axioms of rationality. We arrive at the same conclusion if
we analyze solutions to the problem of choosing from a tournament (where
maximal elements do not necessarily exist). So, in our opinion the notion of
rationality must be discussed, not only in the traditional sense of external
conditions (Sen, 1993) but in terms of the internal information provided by
the binary relation.
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21 Introduction.
One of the most common models employed in economic and social sciences is
that of describing individual choices by means of a maximization problem:
the individual makes choices by selecting, from each feasible set of alter-
natives, those which maximize his own preference relation. There are two
di¤erent ways in which such a procedure may fail to be useful:
1. The set of maximal elements is too large, and a selection among this
set is required.
2. The set of maximal elements is empty.
Consider the following examples that illustrate such cases.
Example 1 An individual chooses according to the binary relation R de-
…ned on X = fa;b;c;d;eg by:
aPe;bPc;bPd;cPd
(the non-mentioned relationships being indi¤erences), but when more than
one maximal exists he selects those which he prefers over the highest number
of alternatives (see Peris & Subiza, 1998). Thus, for instance,
F(fa;b;c;eg)=fa;bg; F(fa;b;cg)=fbg:
Example 2 An individual chooses according to the binary relation R de-
…ned on X = fa;b;c;d;eg by:
aPb;aPd;aPe;bPc;cPa;cPd;cPe;dPe
(the non-mentioned relationships being indi¤erences), but when maximals
do not exist, he chooses the Copeland winners. Thus, for instance,
F(fa;b;c;d;eg)=fa;cg; F(fa;cg)=fcg:
3If we observe the above choice functions, and ask ourselves if they are
rational, in the sense that if a binary relation R¤ exists such that
F(A)=Maximals of R¤ in A for all A µ X;
the answer is no.
The rationality of a choice function is a familiar theme in social choice
theory and has been extensively studied. Basically, most of the results are
devoted to …nding conditions (which, in a sense, may be interpreted as
individual coherence of choice or, in Sen’s words, internal consistency of
choice (Sen, 1993)) that ensure the rationality of the choice function. Such
a notion, however, has been discussed from many di¤erent points of view
(see, for instance, Sen (1993) where this author argues ”against a priori
imposition of requirements of internal consistency of choice”). As Sen points
out, the reasons for violations of rationality are ”easily understandable when
the external context is spelled out”. In other words, the choice function
violates internal consistency due to some external conditions (good manners,
additional information about the menu, freedom of choice, ...) which are
independent from the real preferences.
In our context, however, those violations may be due to choosing by using
additional information from the binary relation, which is not a¤ected by
external conditions. The previous examples show how rationality conditions
are not ful…lled by reasonable choice functions which are not in‡uenced by
external contexts. So, as pointed out by Schwartz (1986), ”how reasonable is
rationality?”. In fact, we can consider the individuals in our examples to be,
in a certain sense, ”more than rational”, since they are able to distinguish,
among maximals, and select the ”better ones”, or to …nd the ”best elements”
4when the set of maximals is empty. It seems clear that rational individuals
should choose maximal elements, but what rationality, in the classical sense,
e n t a i l si st h a t :
the individual chooses maximals, all maximals, and nothing but maximals.
In this paper, we are interested in de…ning weaker notions of rationality,
so that reasonable choice functions (as the ones de…ned in the previous
examples), which fail to be rational in the usual sense, may ful…ll them.
2 Preliminaries.
Throughout the paper X denotes the …nite set of all conceivable alternatives,
whereas P(X) represents the family of all non-empty subsets of X; each
A 2P (X) is called an issue (or agenda) and R denotes a complete and
re‡exive binary relation de…ned on X.F r o mR the two following relations
(the symmetric and asymmetric part, respectively) are de…ned as usual,
indi¤erence: xIy , xRy and yRx;
strict preference: xPy , xRy and not(yRx):
The transitive closure of the asymmetric part of a binary relation R is de-
noted by P1 a n di sd e … n e db y :
xP1y ,9x1;x 2;:::;xk¡1;x k 2 A such that x = x1Px2P:::Pxk¡1Pxk = y.
The set of maximal elements of a complete binary relation R on a subset
A 2P (X) will be denoted by
M(A;R)=fx 2 A j xRy , for all y2 Ag:
We will use the following types of binary relations. Let R be a binary relation
de…ned on X; it is said to be:
5¡ A preorder if xRyRz implies xRz; for all x;y;z 2 X.
¡ An interval-order if xPyRzPt implies xPt, for all x;y;z;t 2 X.
¡ A semiorder if it is an interval-order such that whenever xPyPz, for any
t then xPt or tPz; for all x;y;z;t 2 X:
¡ Quasi-transitive if xPyPz implies xPz; for all x;y;z 2 X.
¡ Acyclic if x1Px2P:::Pxk implies not(xkPx1); for all x1;x 2;:::;x k 2 X:
A choice function is a functional relationship, F : P(X) ¡! P (X) such
that, for every A 2P(X);F(A) is a non-empty subset of A; which represents
those outcomes chosen by the individual or society. The choice function F is
said to be rational, if there is a complete binary relation R such that for all
A 2P (X);F(A)=M(A;R). It must be noted that, in our framework, this
condition implies that the binary relation R is acyclic. Moreover, if a choice
function F is rational, the binary relation which rationalizes it coincides
with the base relation RF de…ned as follows:
aRFb if and only if a 2 F(fa;bg) for all a;b2 X;
so the notion of rationality can be rewritten as:
F(A)=M(A;RF) 8 A µ X:
(This condition is also known in the literature as binariness (Deb, 1983), or
binary choice property (BICH) (Schwartz, 1986)).
Di¤erent axioms have been used in order to characterize rational choice
functions (see Moulin, 1985). The following one will be useful in our discus-
sion:
Sen: for all B 2P(X) and all a 2 B :
a 2 F(B) ,f a 2 F(fa;bg); for all b 2 Bg:
A choice function is rational if and only if it satis…es Sen. The next axiom
6is a necessary condition for a choice function to be rational,
Cherno¤ : B µ B0 ) F(B0) \ B µ F(B) for all B;B0 2P(X):
The notion of rationality has been relaxed, in the literature, in di¤erent
ways. For instance, Deb (1983) introduced the notion of sub-rational choice
function F; if for some order R; M(A;R) µ F(A);f o ra l lA2P (X) (see
Moulin, 1985). In contrast to the classical notion of rationality, if a choice
function is sub-rational, the binary relation which provides this property
does not necessarily coincide with the base relation, although in this case
the base relation is acyclic and M(A;R) µ M(A;RF): A condition which
characterizes sub-rationality is given by Deb (1983):
(Deb) for all B 2P(X), there is x¤ 2 F(B) such that
x¤ 2 A µ B ) x¤ 2 F(A)
3 Reconsidering rationality 1: choosing among max-
imals.
We begin this section with a survey of some speci…c ways of choosing, among
the elements in M(X;R); the ”better ones” by using ”internal” additional
information obtained from the binary relation R.
If the preferences of an individual happens to be a preorder, then the
maximal elements in a feasible set are equivalent, in the sense that if x
and y are maximal elements, they are both simultaneously indi¤erent, or
preferred, to any other element. In such a case, no additional information
can be obtained from the binary relation in order to choose among the
maximal elements. This is not the case of more general kinds of binary
7relations, which, as pointed out by Luce (1956), represent the individual’s
behavior in a better way. In Luce (1956) one way of selecting among the
maximal elements of a binary relation R is presented. In order to de…ne this
selection, a previous result would be required.
De…nition 1 (Luce, 1956). Given the binary relation R de…ned on A,t h e
binary relation R¤is de…ned as follows: xR¤y , not(yP¤x); where
xP¤y ,
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
xPy; or
9 z such that xPz;zIy; or
9 z such that zIx;zPy:
Theorem 1 (Luce, 1956) The binary relation R de…ned on A is a semiorder
if and only if R¤ is a preorder. Moreover, ;6 = M(A;R¤) µ M(A;R):
De…nition 2 Let R be a complete and re‡exive binary relation de…ned on A.
Luce’s maximals are the maximal elements of R¤, LM(A;R)=M(A;R¤):
The problem with Luce’s selection, when R is a general preference rela-
tion (interval-orders, quasiorders or acyclic binary relations), is that such a
selection may be empty-valued. In order to propose a nonempty selection
of the set of maximal elements in those cases , in Peris and Subiza (1998)
two other ways of choosing among maximals are presented (undominated
maximals and strong maximals).
8De…nition 3 Let R be a complete, re‡exive and acyclic binary relation de-
…ned on A; and let a;b 2 A. It is said that a dominates b in A (aDAb),
if
for all x 2 A; bPx ) aPx; bIx ) aRx; and
there is z 2 A; such that faPz;zRbg or faIz;zPbg:
Then, the set of undominated maximals in A consists of
UM(A;R)=fx 2 A j xRy for all y 2 A; and for no z 2 A : zDAxg
It is obvious, from this de…nition, that undominated maximals are a
selection of the set of maximal elements. Moreover, if the binary relation
is an interval-order, the elements in UM(A;R) are equivalent, that is, if
x;y 2 UM(A;R) then xPz if and only if yPz; and xIz if and only if yIz;
for all z 2 A.
An alternative way of choosing among maximal elements, consists of
selecting those maximals which are preferred (direct or indirectly) to the
greatest number of alternatives.
De…nition 4 Let R a complete, re‡exive and acyclic binary relation de…ned
on A: To each alternative a in A we assign the number:
u(a;A)=# fx 2 A j aP1xg
The set of strong maximals of R on A consists of
SM(A;R)=fx 2 A j for no y 2 A : u(y;A) >u (x;A)g
Function u(x;A) in the above de…nition is a speci…c weak-utility function
representing the binary relation R; that is, satisfying that
xPy ) u(x;A) >u (y;A);
9and it is now obvious that the alternatives that maximize a weak-utility
function are maximal elements; strong maximals are therefore a selection of
the set of maximal elements.
Every strong maximal is undominated, so this is a more discriminating
selection. The next result summarizes the relationship between maximals,
Luce’s maximals, undominated maximals and strong maximal elements, de-
pending on the type of relation we consider.
Theorem 2 (Peris & Subiza, 1998). Let R be a complete and re‡exive
binary relation de…ned on the (…nite) set A.T h e n ,i fR is
a) acyclic, M(A;R) ¶ UM(A;R) ¶ SM(A;R) 6= ;
b) an interval-order, M(A;R) ¶ UM(A;R)=SM(A;R) 6= ;
c) a semiorder, M(A;R) ¶ LM(A;R)=UM(A;R)=SM(A;R) 6= ;
d) a preorder, M(A;R)=LM(A;R)=UM(A;R)=SM(A;R) 6= ;
De…nition 5 Let R be a complete and re‡exive binary relation de…ned on
the (…nite) set X. Then, it is possible to de…ne the following choice func-
tions:
a) If R is acyclic, the undominated choice function assigns for all A 2
P(X); the set UM(A;R)
b) If R is acyclic, the strong maximal choice function assigns for all
A 2P (X); the set SM(A;R)
c) If R is a semiorder, Luce’s choice function assigns for all A 2P(X);
the set LM(A;R)
As LM(A;R)=M(X;R¤), it is obvious that Luce’s choice function is
rational. Nevertheless, a choice function coming from an individual who
10is not only able to obtain the maximal elements, but also to di¤erentiate
among them by choosing either undominated or strong maximals, does not
satisfy the usual axioms of rationality, so it would be criticized for being non
rational, even non sub-rational. The following example shows this fact.
Example 3 Let X = fa;b;c;dg and the binary relation on X de…ned by:
aPc; bPd;
being indi¤erences the remainder pairwise relations. If we de…ne the choice
function





F(fb;dg)=fbg; F(fc;dg)=fc;dg; F(fxg)=fxg for all x,
which does not satisfy either Cherno¤ or Deb.
Our objective is, therefore, to propose a weaker notion of rationality,
that is adequate for considering individuals who can, in a logical way,s e l e c t
some of their maximal elements. In order to do so, it seems natural to relax
the classical notion of rationality by asking for the existence of a complete
binary relation R such that for all A 2P (X);F (A) µ M(A;R): It is clear
that this binary relation has to be acyclic, since the existence of maximal
elements in every feasible set is ensured by the non-emptiness of the choice
function. A closer look at the above generalization, will convince us that it
is void because every choice function ful…lls it (consider the binary relation
11that makes all the elements indi¤erent).
A possible approach, in order to generalize rationality in a non-trivial
way, would require that the condition F(A) µ M(A;R); apply to some
particular binary relation. In so doing, as we have already mentioned, if a
choice function F is rational, then the binary relation which rationalizes it
coincides with the base relation. We use this binary relation in the next
de…nition.
De…nition 6 Ac h o i c ef u n c t i o nF is called basically-rational (b-rational
in what follows) if for all A 2P (X);
F(A) µ M(A;RF):
It is clear that rationality implies b-rationality. Moreover, as in the case
of rational choice functions, b-rationality implies that the base relation RF
is acyclic. The converse however is not true, as we show in the following
example.
Example 4 Let X = fa;b;cg; and the choice function de…ned by:
F(X)=fa;bg;F(fa;bg)=fag;F(fa;cg)=fag;
F(fb;cg)=fbg;F(fxg)=fxg for all x 2 X:
The base relation is acyclic (in fact, it is the order aPFbPFc) but F(X) is
not contained in M(X;RF); so F is not b-rational.
The above example also shows that b-rationality is not a trivial con-
dition, in the sense that not all choice functions are b-rational. The idea
of this de…nition is to require that the individual be completely rational in
12pairwise comparisons; that is to say, when the feasible set has just two ele-
ments, the individual must choose both of them if and only if he considers
these elements to be ”equally good” for him.
In order to analyze how strong b-rationality is, some considerations can
be made. Given a choice function we can consider the (non-empty) family
of binary relations:
R(F)=fR 2 R(X) j F(A) µ M(A;R);f o ra l lA2P (X)g:
If there is a binary relation R¤ such that its maximal elements coincide with
T
R2R(F)
M(A;R), such a relation will be the minimal one (with respect to
the set-inclusion of its maximal elements) in R(F). There are some clear
cases in which such a relation exists: the most obvious example is that of a
rational choice function, where R¤ coincides with the base relation. In the
following Proposition we show that this relation always exists (and coincides
with the revealed preference relation).
Proposition 1 Let F : P(X) !P (X) be a choice function. Then, there
exists a binary relation R¤ such that:
a) F(A) µ M(A;R¤) for all A2P(X):
b) If for some binary relation R it is satis…ed that
F(A) µ M(A;R) for all A2P(X);
then M(A;R¤) µ M(A;R) for all A2P (X):
Moreover, F is b-rational if and only if R¤ = RF:
Proof. De…ne relation R¤ as follows (revealed preference relation):
xR ¤ y ,9B 2P (X) such that x;y 2 B and x 2 F(B):
From this de…nition, it is clear that if a 2 F(A); then aR ¤ x for all x 2 A;
13so a 2 M(A;R¤) and F(A) µ M(A;R¤): If R is any binary relation such
that F(A) µ M(A;R); then a 2 M(A;R¤) implies aR¤y for all y 2 A: Thus,
some By 2P(X) will exist such that, a;y 2 By and a 2 F(By) µ M(By;R);
which implies aRy for all y 2 A; so M(A;R¤) µ M(A;R):
Finally, if R¤ = RF it is obvious that the choice function is b-rational.
Conversely, if F is b-rational, M(fx;yg;R ¤) ¶ F(fx;yg)=M(fx;yg;R F) ¶
M(fx;yg;R ¤); so R¤ = RF:
From the above result, a question arises: can we presume that a choice
function is b-rational or, if not R¤ is the trivial relation (all alternatives
are indi¤erent)?. Example 2 shows that this is not the case, since F is not
b-rational and the binary relation R¤ is:
aI¤b;aP¤c;bP¤c:
We know that rational choice functions can be characterized in terms of
some coherence properties which involve the behavior of the choice function
when the set presented for choice expands or contracts. The following axiom
characterizes the b-rationality of a choice function:
Axiom 1 (A1): for all B 2P (X) and all a 2 B :
a 2 F(B) )f a 2 F(fa;bg); for all b 2 Bg:
One can readily see that condition (A1),a l s oc a l l e dInverse Condorcet
Property in the literature, is part of Sen’s property, so that it is a necessary
condition (though not su¢cient) for rational choice functions. This condition
can be also interpreted as a weak Cherno¤ condition, applying only to binary
subsets. As mentioned in Deb (1983), condition (A1) has a simple intuitive
interpretation: ”if x is picked in some set B it should never be rejected in
14pairwise choice for all pairs which are subsets of B": The elemental proof of
the characterization result is omitted.
Theorem 3 A choice function is b-rational i¤ it satis…es (A1).
Sub-rationality, as we have already mentioned, requires that a choice
function contains a rational selection; the idea behind this notion (or a pos-
sible interpretation of it) is that the individual chooses some non-maximal
alternatives due, for instance, to some lack of perception (as in the famous
co¤ee and sugar example, Luce 1956). Our analysis has the converse intu-
ition: it may be the case that the agent knows his maximal elements per-
fectly, and moreover, chooses among them in a speci…c way. The following
example then, shows that sub-rationality and b-rationality are independent
conditions.
Example 5 Let X = fa;b;cg and the choice function de…ned by:
F(fxg)=fxg;x2 X; F(fa;bg)=a; F(fa;cg)=a;
F(fb;cg)=b; F(fa;b;cg)=fa;b;cg:
It is sub-rational, but it does not satisfy (A1).




F(fb;dg)=fbg;F(fc;d)g)=fcg;F(fxg)=fxg;f o ra l lx :
This choice function is not sub-rational, yet it is easy to observe that (A1)
holds.
15When analyzing rationality, several additional conditions can be found
in the literature that provide more information about the binary relation
that rationalizes the choice function. For instance, the Arrow axiom char-
acterizes rationality by means of a preorder, whereas Aizerman, Cherno¤
and Expansion axioms characterize rationality by means of a quasitransi-
tive relation (see, for instance, Moulin (1985)). It is possible to analyze
conditions in order to ensure such properties of the base relation in the case
of b-rationality. The Aizerman axiom, and a weak modi…cation of the Ar-
row axiom, are su¢cient to imply, respectively, the quasitransitivity and
transitivity of the base relation.
Aizerman: for all A;B 2P(X);F (B) µ A µ B ) F(A) µ F(B):
Axiom 2 (A2): for all a;b;c 2 X; and for all fx;yg½f a;b;cg;
F(fa;b;cg) \f x;yg6 = ;)F(fx;yg)=F(fa;b;cg) \f x;yg:
Theorem 4 Let F : P(X) !P(X) be a choice function satisfying (A1).
a) If F satis…es Aizerman, then F is quasitransitive b-rational (RF is qua-
sitransitive).
b) If F satis…es (A2), then F is transitive b-rational (RF is transitive).
Proof. We know that (A1) implies b-rationality. In order to prove the
quasitransitivity in a), consider x;y;z 2 X such that xPFy;yPFz,t h a ti s ,
F(fx;yg)=fxg;F(fy;zg)=fyg:
(A1) implies that the only possibility for F(fx;y;zg) is,
F(fx;y;zg)=fxg;
and then Aizerman implies F(fx;zg)=fxg; that is xPFz:
16The proof of b) runs parallel to the one in Moulin (1985), Theorem 3,
and it is omitted.
The following example shows a choice function satisfying (A1), (A2) and
Aizerman, which is not rational in the classical sense.
Example 6 Consider the choice function F de…ned on X = fa;b;c;dg as
follows:
F(X)=fa;b;cg; F(A)=A for all A 2P (X);A6= X:
It is clear that F satis…es the axioms in Theorem 4, but it is not rational,
since it does not satisfy Sen’s axiom.
In the following result, we prove that the undominated and the strong
maximal choice functions satisfy b-rationality.
Proposition 2 1) The undominated choice function is b-rational.
2) The strong maximal choice function is b-rational.
Proof. 1) Let R be a binary relation, and consider the choice function
de…ned by:
F(A)=UM(A;R) µ M(A;R) for all A 2P(X):
If we prove that R coincides with RF , then the choice function is b-rational.
Let a;b 2 X such that aPFb; this implies F(fa;bg)=fag; and therefore
UM(fa;bg;R)=fag; that is aPb: The converse is also true, so that we have
aPFb if and only if aPb:
2) Analogous to part 1).
The following example shows that there are b-rational choice functions
that cannot be expressed either as the undominated maximals, or as the
strong maximals of the base relation.
17Example 7 Consider the choice function F de…ned in X = fa;b;c;dg as:
F(fxg)=fxg; for all x 2 X; F(X)=fcg; F(fa;b;cg)=fag;
F(fa;b;dg)=fag; F(fa;c;dg)=fag; F(fb;c;dg)=fcg;
F(fa;bg)=fag; F(fa;cg)=fa;cg; F(fa;dg)=fag;
F(fb;cg = fcg; F(fb;dg)=fbg; F(fc;dg)=fcg
Is is obvious that F(A) µ M(A;RF); so the choice function is b-rational.
Nevertheless, F(X) 6= UM(X;RF)=SM(X;RF)=fa;cg.
4 Reconsidering rationality 2: there are not max-
imal elements.
So far, we have tried to extend the notion of rationality by looking for a
binary relation R in such a way that the choice function is a subset of the
set of maximal elements of R. This fact implies that such a binary relation is
acyclic, and there are well-known choice functions de…ned for more general
binary relations This is the case, for instance, that of the solutions to the
problem of choosing from tournaments: complete and assymetric binary
relations P, where aPb is interpreted as ”alternative a beats alternative
b”. This kind of binary relation arises in many di¤erent models: sports
competitions, biometric and psychometric models, collective choice,... (see
Moulin, 1986).
An important approach to discussing the notion of rationality may be
found in Schwartz (1986). He argues that if the choice function comes from
the aggregation of several individual preferences (social choice functions),
”the impossibility theorems show [rationality] to be unreasonable as a gen-
18eral assumption”. This fact gives sense to the analysis of the problem of
choosing from binary relations which may have no maximal elements and,
for instance, with this aim Schwartz (1986) introduces two choice functions,
namely GETCHA and GOCHA. We now introduce these solutions.
De…nition 7 Given a binary relation R de…ned on X; and given A 2P(X);
as u b s e tB of A is said to be dominant in A; if B is nonempty and xPy for
every x 2 B and every y 2 A¡B: Moreover, B is a minimum dominant
subset of A if B is dominant and no proper subset of B is dominant.
Schwartz (1986) proves that if P is an asymmetric binary relation then
every set A has a unique minimum dominant subset, so we have the following
de…nition.
De…nition 8 Given a binary relation R the GETCHA choice function is
given by: for all A 2P(X);
Ge(A)= minimum dominant subset of A:
De…nition 9 Given a binary relation R de…ned on X; and given A 2P(X);
as u b s e tB of A is said to be undominated in A; if B is nonempty and
not(yPx) for every x 2 B and every y 2 A¡B: Moreover, B is a minimum
undominated subset of A if B is undominated and no proper subset of B
is undominated.
Unlike the dominant sets, there is not single minimum undominated
subset, so the following choice function is de…ned in terms of the union of
minimum undominated subsets.
19De…nition 10 Given a binary relation R the GOCHA choice function is
de…ned by: for all A 2P(X);
Go(A)= the union of minimum undominated subsets of A:
Another important solution function for choosing the ”best” elements
whenever maximals do not exist, is given by the notion of uncovered set
(introduced by Miller (1977) and Fishburn (1977) for asymmetric binary
relations, and extended for general binary relations in Peris and Subiza
(1999)). Formally,
De…nition 11 Let R be a complete and re‡exive binary relation de…ned on
A; and let a;b 2 A.I ti ss a i dt h a ta covers b in A (aCAb),i f
aPb; and
for all x 2 A; bPx ) aPx; bIx ) aRx:
De…nition 12 Given a binary relation R the Uncovered choice function
is de…ned by:
UC(A;R)=fx 2 A j for no y 2 A : yCAxg:
Apart of the above mentioned choice functions, other ways of choosing
in non acyclic binary relations have been introduced in the literature. We
must mention the important notion of minimal covering (Dutta 1988; also
extended for general binary relations in Peris and Subiza (1999)), as well as
the bipartisan set (La¤ond, Laslier and Le Breton, 1995), the essential set
(Dutta and Laslier (1999)), and the Copeland set (Copeland, 1951, Henriet,
1985), among others.
20None of these choice functions satisfy the classical notion of rationality.
In order to extend such a notion to the context we are now analyzing, where
maximal elements may or may not exist, it must be mentioned that it seems
natural to assume that maximals, provided they exist, must be selected
(Condorcet consistency). All the above mentioned solution functions satisfy
Condorcet consistency and we can therefore de…ne an extension of the notion
of rationality in an opposite direction as in the previous section: by looking
for a complete binary relation R such that, for all A 2P (X);
F(A) ¶ M(A;R):
The idea is to ask for the same condition as in Deb (1983), without imposing
acyclicity on the binary relation. It must be noted, however, that every
choice function satis…es this condition: it is su¢cient to de…ne the binary
relation P as follows:
xPy for all x;y 2 X;x 6= y:
Since the set of maximal elements in every subset with at least two elements
is empty, the condition is obviously ful…lled.
By following a parallel analysis as in the previous section, we ask that
the base relation be the one which ful…lls this condition.
De…nition 13 A choice function F is called basically-sub-rational (bs-
rational in what follows) if for all A µ X;
F(A) ¶ M(A;RF):
The following axiom characterizes bs-rationality (the elemental proof of
the result is omitted).
21Axiom 3 (A3): for all B µ X and all a 2 B :
fa 2 F(fa;bg); for all b 2 Bg)a 2 F(B):
Theorem 5 A choice function is bs-rational i¤ it satis…es (A3).
Note that this axiom, known in the literature as Direct Condorcet Prop-
erty,i st h eother part of Sen’s axiom (the …rst half is axiom (A1)). This is
not surprising, since b-rationality plus bs-rationality coincide with the clas-
sical notion of rational choice functions. The next result, taken from Deb
(1983), shows how asking for any additional property on the base relation,
gives rise to the notion of sub-rationality.
Theorem 6 (Deb, 1983). A choice function F : P(X) !P (X) is bs-
rational with RF being acyclic i¤ F satis…es Deb axiom.
I nt h ef o l l o w i n gr e s u l t ,w ep r o v et h a tt h eu s u a ls o l u t i o nc o n c e p t sw eh a v e
introduced in this section de…ne choice functions which are bs-rational (we
only prove it for the GETCHA, GOCHA and Uncovered choice functions,
although the result is also true for the minimal covering and the essential
set).
Proposition 3 1) The GETCHA choice function is bs-rational.
2) The GOCHA choice function is bs-rational.
3) The Uncovered choice function is bs-rational.
Proof. It is easy to observe that, in all three cases, the base relation RF
coincides with the binary relation R which de…nes the choice functions.
221) It is clear that M(A;RF) is contained in every dominant subset of A;
since there is not x 2 A such that xPFa for a 2 M(A;RF): So M(A;RF) is
contained in the minimum dominant subset.
2) If a 2 M(A;RF); then it is obvious that fag is a minimum undom-
inated subset, and M(A;RF) is contained in the union of the minimum
undominated subsets.
3) Since a maximal element is not covered by any other, M(A;RF) is
contained in the uncovered subset.
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